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Abstract
The paper mainly analyzes information technology 
outsourcing incentive problems of both principal and 
the agent’s risk aversion under unilateral moral hazard. 
Outsourcing incentive mainly achieves goals of motivation 
toward the agent through adjustment and balance of the 
effort level and output sharing proportion. The conclusions 
are: Firstly, the more the external uncertainties influence, 
the lower output sharing proportion and effort level are; 
secondly, the bigger risk aversion is, the lower income 
both sides will get; thirdly, the bigger the cost coefficient 
of the agent is, the less income the principal can get. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since Kodak Company outsourced their IT business 
to IBM, IT outsourcing has become more and more 
popular in the world. Some scholars pointed out that 
IT outsourcing can bring organization benefits, such as 
improving organizational performance (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000), sustaining competitive advantage (Sadiq, 2011), 
increasing business efficiency (Agrawal & Haleem, 2013), 
stimulating innovation (Su, Levina, & Ross, 2016), etc.. 
Whatever the relationship between IT outsourcing and 
organizational performance is, IT outsourcing has become 
one economic trend.
In the actual IT outsourcing market,  there is 
information asymmetry between the principal and 
the agent. Generally speaking, agent masters more 
information advantage: Compared with the principal, the 
agent knows more about cost, his professional qualities, 
the outsourcing market quotation, etc.. As the information 
asymmetry exists, the problem of adverse selection and 
moral-hazard is inevitable, namely the agent may hurt 
the principal’s interests by his information advantage. 
Therefore, it is vital to sign contract to safeguard the 
interests of both parties. The design of outsourcing 
contract is the main method to overcome adverse selection 
and moral-hazard (Shi & Wang, 2011; Song, Dan, & 
Zhang, 2010).
So far, the literature that related with IT outsourcing 
have assumed the principal’s risk neutrality and the 
agent’s risk aversion, such as literature (Li, Song, & 
Xu, 2013; Gao, Wei, & Li, 2008; Wang & Hou, 2014; 
Holmstrom, 1999). These assumptions are both reasonable 
and logical; however, we cannot neglect a fact: For 
the principal and the agent, they all need risk aversion 
because risks are everywhere and the outsourcing market 
is fluctuant. Therefore, is maybe biased to consider only 
the agent needs risk aversion, as an economic man, the 
principal also needs risk aversion.
Holmstrom et al. (1987) researched that moral hazard 
arose from the uncertainties of the final output of the 
contract. Jullien et al. (2006) found that in the principal-
agent situations, the bigger the risk aversion of the agent, 
the worse motivation toward the agent. Gritzalis et al. 
(2007) researched IT outsourcing incentive probability 
model that can ensure the client’s information security. 
Belhaj et al. (2014) explored the moral hazard problem 
of both the principal and the agent’s risk aversion and 
concluded that intensity of moral hazard depended 
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on investment risk predictability degree. When the 
investment risk can be observed, the motivation can be 
more effective relatively. Tseng et al. (2014) studied moral 
hazard in the maintenance outsourcing and designed 
incentive contract that based on performance. They found 
if the agent’s risk aversion was high, it was more difficult 
for both sides’ channel coordination.
1. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Assumption 1: The principal and the agent are the 
economic man. They try utmost to pursue the maximum 
profits for themselves. They won’t do anything that may 
hurt interests of themselves.
Assumption 2: After signing the contract, the agent is 
responsible for the contract. The effort level of the agent 
is directly related with final output and can be determined 
by the agent. Obviously, the higher the effort level is, 
the more output can be obtained. The output function is 
π=e+ε. Variable e is the effort level of the agent, and ε 
measures the external uncertainties that can impact the 
final output and can be controlled by the agent. ε∈N(0, 
σ2).
Assumption 3: The payment mode is P=α+βπ, namely 
the principal will pay a fixed payment α to the agent, 
α>0.Then the principal will pay the agent according 
to the agent’s final output and determine the sharing 
proportion β, 0 < β <1. We can find that if β=0, and then 
the principal will undertake all the risks in the outsourcing 
because whatever the final output is, he has accomplished 
payment. If β=1, then the agent will undertake all the 
risks in the outsourcing process because no matter how 
hard he tries, his revenue is absolutely determined by the 
principal’s judgment to his final output.
Assumption 4: The agent can choose his effort level. 
The higher the effort level is, the higher his cost is because 
he should invest more resources, such as money, energy, 
time, etc.. The agent’s cost function is C=0.5be2, b means 
cost coefficient.
Assumption 5: Define π1 as the principal’s revenue 
and π2 as the agent’s revenue. Define Eπ1 as the principal’s expected revenue and Eπ2 as the agent’s expected revenue. Then 
   π1 = x-α-βx=-α+(1-β)π , 
   π2 = α+βx-
1
2 be
2, 
  Eπ1=E(x-α-βx)=-α+(1-β)e ,
  
 2 2
2
1 1( )
2 2
E E x be e beπ α β α β= + − = + − .
Assumption 5: Both the principal and the agent are 
risk aversion, each of them have an Arrow-Pratt risk 
aversion degree ρ1, ρ2, 0<ρ1<ρ2. According to literature Gao 
et al. (2008), the agent’s risk cost equals 0.5ρ2Var(π2). As 
we know, in the process of IT outsourcing, the principal 
also confronts uncertainties and risks, furthermore, 
the principal’s uncertainties mainly come from the 
uncertainties of the agent’s final output. Hence, we 
assume that the principal and the agent face the same risk 
sources. Therefore we assume risk cost of the principal 
is 0.5ρ1Var(π1). If both sides are risk aversion, their real 
income equals to expect revenue deducting the risk cost. 
After calculation, risk cost of the principal and the agent 
can be obtained respectively:
0.5ρ1(1-β)
2σ2, 0.5ρ2 β
2σ2.
After the assumptions, the incentive model of IT 
outsourcing can be constructed as follows:
       Max[-α+(1-β)e-0.5ρ1(1-β)
2σ2] , (1)
       (IR)α+βe-0.5be2-0.5ρ2β
2σ2≥ω ,———  (2)
   
 ( )IC e
b
β
=  . (3)
Formula (1) means the objective function of the 
maximum value of the principal’s real income; Formula 
(2) means the agent’s real income is at least more than his 
reserved income ω——— or his opportunity cost ω———; Formula (3) 
is the agent’s participation condition.
2. MODELING ANALYSIS
Combining Formula (1), (2) and (3), we can figure out β*, 
e*.β* represents the optimal output sharing proportion, and 
e* means the optimal effort level.
   
 2* 1
2 2
1 2
1
1
b
b b
ρ σ
β
ρ σ ρ σ
+
=
+ +
, (4)
                        
   
 2* 1
2 2
1 2
1
(1 )
be
b b b
ρ σ
ρ σ ρ σ
+
=
+ +
. (5)
Proposition 1: The more the external uncertainties 
influence, the lower output sharing proportion and effort 
level are.
Proof: 
   
 2
1
2 2
1 2
1lim
1
b
b bσ
ρ σ ρ
ρ ρρ σ ρ σ→∞
+
=
+ + + , (6)
     
 2*
2 1
2 2 2
1 2
2 (1 ) 0
(1 )
b b
b b
ρ σ ρ σβ
σ ρ σ ρ σ
− +∂
= <
∂ + +
. (7)
Likewise, we can prove the bigger σ is, the lower 
effort level is. Because β* and e* are directly proportional 
relationship. Hence, they have the same variation 
tendency.
Proposition 1 gives us enlightenment: If there are 
many external uncertainties that are uncontrollable by the 
agent and can impact the final output, the optimal revenue 
sharing ratio and the agent’s effort level will decrease. 
In that way, the principal can get more output sharing 
proportion and almost undertake all the outsourcing risk. 
At the same time, the lower effort level indicates the 
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vulnerable and inefficient motivation toward the agent. 
Namely, the more external uncertainties there are, the 
more risks the principal takes and the more output sharing 
proportion he gets and the worse the motivation is.
Proposition 2: The higher the risk aversion ρ1 is, the bigger β* and e* are; the higher the risk aversion ρ2 is, the lower β* and e
*
 are. 
Proof:
    
 2 4*
2
2 2 2
1 1 2
0
(1 )
b
b b
ρ σβ
ρ ρ σ ρ σ
∂
= >
∂ + +
, (8)
    
 2 2*
1
2 2 2
2 1 2
(1 ) 0
(1 )
b b
b b
σ ρ σβ
ρ ρ σ ρ σ
− +∂
= <
∂ + +
. (9)
From Formula (8), (9), with the increasing of ρ1, the 
optimal sharing ratio β* will increase correspondingly; 
with the increasing of ρ2, the optimal sharing ratio β
*
 will 
decrease. 
Because β* and e
*
 are directly proportional relationship, 
they have the same variation tendency. Likewise, we can 
prove with the increasing of ρ1, the optimal effort level 
e* will increase and with the increasing of ρ2, the optimal 
effort level e* will decrease. 
Proposition 2 tell us: If the principal hates risks 
seriously, though he gets less output sharing proportion, 
the effort level of the agent will improve and motivation 
is relatively efficient; if the agent hates risks seriously, 
though he gets less output sharing proportion, he can 
alleviate his work load and decrease effort level.
Proposition 3: The bigger risk aversion of the 
principal is, the lower real income he gets; the bigger risk 
aversion of the agent is, the lower real income he gets.
Proof: from Formula (4), (5), we have known e*, β*, 
combine Formula (1), (2), we can get each real income as 
followings:
  
 2 2 2 4
2 1 1 2
2 2 2
1 2
(2 2 )
2(1 )
b b
b b
ρ σ ρ σ ρ ρ σ
α
ρ σ ρ σ
+ −
− +
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, (10)
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α
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Formula (11) defines the real income of the agent. From 
(11) and the above assumption 1, α means fixed payment, 
it is a constant, economic man pursues maximum profits. 
Therefore, only when
 2 2 2
1 2
2 2 2
1 2
(1 ) (1 ) 0
2 (1 )
b b
b b b
ρ σ ρ σ
ρ σ ρ σ
+ −
>
+ +
, can 
the agent accept the outsourcing contract theoretically, or 
he will reject the contract. Hence, 1-bρ2σ
2>0.
Calculate first-order derivative of ρ1 of (10), we can 
get:
 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1
2 2 3
1 2
2 [0.5 (1 ) (1 )]
(1 )
b b b b b
b b
σ ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ
ρ σ ρ σ
+ − − +
+ +
.
 (12)
0<ρ1<ρ2,bρ2σ
2<1⇒bρ1σ
2<bρ2σ
2<1⇒0.5bρ2σ
2(1+bρ1σ
2-
bρ2σ
2)-(1+bρ1σ
2)<0. 
So value of Formula (12) is less than 0. 
Likewise, calculate first-order derivative of ρ2 of (11), 
we can get:
   
 2 2 2
2 1
2 2 3
1 2
( 3)
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b b b
b b
σ ρ σ ρ σ
ρ σ ρ σ
− −
+ +
 . (13)
0<ρ 1<ρ 2,  bρ 2σ
2<1⇒ bρ 1σ
2<bρ 2σ
2<1⇒ bσ 2(bρ 2σ
2-
bρ1σ
2-3)<0.
So value of formula (13) is less than 0. 
Proposition 3 tells us the relationship between the risk 
aversion and their real income. 
Proposition 4: The bigger the cost coefficient, the less 
real income the principal can get.
Proof: Calculate first-order derivative of b of (10), we 
can get:
 2 4 4 2 2
1 1 2 1 2
2 2 3
1 2
2 2 2 4
0
(1 )
b b
b b
ρ σ ρ ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ
ρ σ ρ σ
+ + +
− <
+ +
.
 
(14)
As the first order derivative is less than 0, therefore 
bigger the cost coefficient, the less income.
Proposition 4 tells the necessity for the principal to 
cooperate with qualified partners.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The paper mainly analyzes information technology 
outsourcing incentive problems of both principal and 
the agent’s risk aversion under unilateral moral-hazard. 
The conclusions are as following: Firstly, the more 
the external uncertainties influence, the lower output 
sharing proportion and effort level are; secondly, the 
bigger risk aversion of the principal is, the lower real 
income he gets; the bigger risk aversion of the agent 
is, the lower real income he gets; thirdly, the bigger the 
cost coefficient of the agent is, the less real income the 
principal can get.
The discussions are as following. Firstly, traditional 
outsourcing incentive problems mainly explore the 
adjustment of effort level and output sharing proportion 
to achieve the motivation toward the agent. Therefore, 
the key is to balance the relationship of the effort level 
and the sharing ratio. As there are always uncertainties 
in the market, it is inevitable to avoid risks. The more 
the uncertainties influence, the lower output sharing 
ratio and effort level are. Though uncertainties are 
uncontrollable, this is the balance mechanism and 
can ensure the agent to fulfill the contract. Secondly, 
risk aversion measures the attitude toward risk. When 
both risk aversion is very high, their real income will 
decrease. In fact, high risk aversion means the principal 
and the agent hate risks and pursue secure income. As 
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we known, income is always along with risks. The more 
one avoid risks and the more secure he pursues, the less 
he obtains actually. Finally, it is very necessary for the 
principal to cooperate with qualified partners because 
the agent’s cost coefficient is directly negatively related 
to his income.
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